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RECENT DECISIONS
Ar.mNs-DENATURALIZATION-REQUIREMENT THAT THE GoVERNMENT BE
DECEIVED IN NATURALIZATION PROCEEDING AS BASIS FOR DENATURALIZATION-

Defendant Umberto Anastasio, arrived in this country as a deserting seaman
in 1917. A certificate of registry was granted in 1931 upon the fraudulent
allegation in his application and testimony before an immigration inspector
that he had never been arrested.1 After filing other papers necessary for naturalization, defendant was issued a certificate of arrival in 1933 based on the
certificate of registry. Before obtaining citizenship, however, defendant
executed an affidavit which revealed his criminal record and filed a consent of dismissal of his petition for naturalization in 1935. In 1942, while
in the United States Army, defendant applied for naturalization and fully
revealed his previous criminal record. A new certificate of arrival was
issued in 1943 based upon the 1931 certificate of registry. In 1943, the
Common Pleas Court of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, admitted the
defendant to citizenship upon the recommendation2 of an Immigration
and Naturalization Service examiner who had interviewed the defendant,
was aware of his previous criminal record, had a file containing the 19311935 naturalization proceeding, but lacked the registry file. In a denaturalization proceeding in 1952, defendant's certificate of naturalization
was cancelled and the order admitting him to citizenship revoked on the
ground that the certificate of arrival granted in 1943 was based upon the
void certificate of registry issued in 1931 and that the use of the latter
certificate in the 1943 naturalization proceeding was fraud on the court.8
On appeal, held, reversed, one judge dissenting. Although the defendant
had concealed his criminal record in a prior naturalization proceeding, his
disclosure in the 1942 proceeding estopped the government from claiming
that citizenship has been granted because of the practice of fraud or illegality. United States v. Anastasio, (3d Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 912, cert.
den. (U.S. 1956) 76 S.Ct. 787.
1 The record indicated that defendant had been arrested five times prior to the
filing of the Application for Registry. Principal case at 913-914.
2 The examiner based his recommendation upon the defendant's commanding officer's
approval of the application for citizenship and because the arrests disclosed had occurred
ten years prior to the defendant's petition. For a holding that false statements, knowingly
made prior to the statutory period and before the date of the petition, are relevant to a
determination of good character during the period required by law, see Stevens v. United
States, (7th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 880. Under the present law, the court is not limited
to a consideration of petitioner's conduct during the five years immediately preceding the
filing of the petition but may consider conduct at any time prior to that period. 66 Stat.
L. 243 (1952), 8 U.S.C. (1952) §1427 (e).
8 United States v. Anastasio, (D.C. N.J. 1954) 120 F. Supp. 435.
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Although Congress exercised the power given it by the Constitution4
to establish a uniform, law of naturalization in 1790,5 it was not until 1906

that there was a specific legislative provision for denaturalization. 6 In
contrast to most European denaturalization statutes, which revoke citizenship only because of acts occurring subsequent to naturalization,7 the
American statute was based upon the theory that naturalized citizenship
is void ab initio when obtained by fraud or illegality. Our statute deprives the naturalized citizen of the citizenship that was never rightfully
his because he obtained it by fraud or because he failed to comply with
the mandatory statutory provisions to perfect it. Thus, the American
statute is not ex post facto when applied to naturalization proceedings
initiated prior to its enactment.8 The present denaturalization action was
part of the attorney general's drive to deport prominent criminals9 and
was brought under the Naturalization Act of 1940.10 The majority in the
principal case reached its decision by two steps: (1) that a denaturalization
proceeding is essentially an action for rescission and, thus, the government
must prove not only that the defendant was guilty of fraud, but also that
it relied upon his fraudulent representation and was deceived thereby,
and (2) that the government had constructive notice of the defendant's
fraud because its examiner had knowledge of defendant's criminal record

U.S. CONST., art. I, §8.
1 Stat. L. 103 (1790).
34 Stat. L. 596 (1906). As to prior methods of denaturalization, see Roche, "Prestatutory Denaturalization," 35 CORN. L. Q. 120 (1949).
7 See the collection of foreign statutes in 44 CoL. L. R.Ev. 740, n. 14 (1944).
s The statute under which the proceeding involved in the principal case was brought
permitted cancellation of certificates of citizenship "on the ground of fraud or on the
ground that such certificate of citizenship was illegally procured." 34 Stat. L. 601 (1906),
re-enacted as 54 Stat. L. 1158 (1940), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §738. The Supreme Court, in upholding the statute's constitutionality, declaredt "The act imposes no punishment upon
an alien who has previously procured a certificate of citizenship by fraud or other illegal
conduct. It simply deprives him of his ill-gotten privileges.•. .'' Johannessen v. United
States, 225 U.S. 227 at 242, 32 S.Ct. 613 (1912). For criticism of this view, see Justice
Rutledge's concurring opinion in Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 at 167,
63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943), in which he says that this creates "two classes of citizens, one free
and independent, one haltered with a lifetime string tied to its status.'' See also 50 CoL.
L. R.Ev. 674 (1950). See, generally, Roche, "Statutory Denaturalization: 1906-1951," 13
UNIV. Prrr. L. R.Ev. 276 (1952).
9 For judicial recognition of this program, see Shaughnessy v. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280
at 281, 75 S.Ct. 746 (1955).
10 54 Stat. L. 1158 (1940), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §738. The denaturalization_ proceeding was
instigated on December 10, 1952. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 did not
come into effect until December 24, 1952. One of the reasons for beginning the action
prior to the effective date of this new statute might have been that it eliminated illegal
procurement as a grounds for denaturalization and replaced fraud with "concealment
of a material fact or by willful misrepresentations.'' 66 Stat. L. 260 (1952), 8 U.S.C. (1952)
§1451 (a). For a holding that the government cannot maintain proceedings under the
1952 act to cancel certificates illegally but not fraudulently procured prior to 1952, see
United States v. Stromberg, 24 p.S. LAw WEEK 2237 (1955).
4
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when defendant applied for naturalization. This is vulnerable to attack
on both levels. The act under which the denaturalization proceeding was
brought had two distinct and severable grounds for denaturalization, fraud
and illegality.11 Assuming that there was no fraud established (which is
highly doubtful12) the naturalization was nevertheless illegally procured
because there was not complete adherence to the prescribed requirements
of the statute.13 The Nationality Act of 1940 required that a certificate of
arrival be attached to all petitions for naturalization,14 and since defendant's certificate was based upon his fraudulent registry record (and therefore void) he failed to comply with the statute.15 Further, to use estoppeJ16
to prevent the government from denaturalizing the defendant injects into
denaturalization law a slippery concept the net effect of which is to defeat
the legislative intent of preventing one who practices fraud from obtaining
citizenship.17 Not only does this present a problem of separation of
powers18 but estopping the government because of the negligence or error
in judgment of a minor member of the executive branch could prevent the

11 See note 8 supra.
12 The defendant told

the examiner, under oath, that he had not been absent from
the country, whereas in his personal history statement filled out in conjunction with his
application for citizenship he revealed that he had visited Canada frequently. Petition
for rehearing, p. 6.
13 In United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472 at 475, 37 S.Ct. 422 (1917), the Court,
in holding that there is no right to naturalization unless all statutory requirements are
complied with, said that a certificate of citizenship was illegally procured because the
judge gave the oath in his chambers instead of in open court as required by the act. In
Schwinn v. United States, 311 U.S. 616, 61 S.Ct. 70 (1940), denaturalization was sustained
because of the failure of a witness to meet the statutory qualifications even though the
defects were unknown to the petitioner.
14 Although defendant was naturalized under an amendment to the Nationality Act
of 1940, which liberalized the requirements as to declaration of intention, period of residence, English language, etc., the necessity of attaching a certificate of arrival to the
petition was not eliminated as one of the requirements. 56 Stat. L. 182 (1942), 8 U.S.C.
(1942) §1001.
15 "Filing the certificate of arrival being a matter of substance, it is clear that no
power is vested in the naturalization court to dispense with it.•.• Naturalization granted
without the certificate having been filed is, therefore, 'illegally procured'." United States
v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319 at 324-325, 38 S.Ct. 118 (1917). See also Maney v. United States, 27S
U.S. 17, 49 S.Ct. 15 (1928).
16 The majority said that the examiner, being aware of defendant's criminal record,
must have realized that defendant had fraudulently concealed it in his registry proceeding
in 1931 or else he would not have been given a certificate of registry. But see United
States v. Accardo, (D.C. N.J. 1953) 113 F. Supp. 783, affd. (3d Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 632,
cert. den. 347 U.S. 952, 74 S.Ct. 677 (1954), where the court refused to cllarge the government with knowledge of the defendant's concealment of a conviction because it was known
to the State Department, a separate branch of the Immigration office, and the United
States Probation Office.
17 The defendant did not reveal his fraud in obtaining the certificate of registry.
18 See the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Biggs in the denial of the petition for
rehearing (principal case at 923) in which he states that it is difficult to see how an error
of judgment committed by the executive branch can be imputed to the judicial branch.
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government from correcting the errors of its many employees.19 The decision in the principal case seems to reward deceit. It repudiates the doctrine that an alien seeking citizenship has a duty to make full disclosure.20
Charles B. Renfrew, S.Ed.

19 Even those who urge that the government should be bound by estoppel or constructive notice make a distinction between the case of a minor employee and the authorized administrative head who has the power to speak for the agency he represents. See,
generally, Berger, "Estoppel against the Government," 21 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 680 (1954).
20 It is hard to see why the principle adopted by the court in United States v.
Accardo, note 16 supra, that the alien seeking naturalization has the duty of making full
disclosure in order that the government may investigate, is not applicable.

